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Abstract:  
Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal 
incentive contracts when first an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding 
agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-
a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an 
‘inequity averse’ principal compared to a ‘status seeking’ principal. Then we extend our 
analysis and characterize the optimal contracts when both other-regarding principal and 
other-regarding agent interact.  
 
Keywords: Other regarding preferences, self regarding preferences, inequity-averse, 
status- seeking, optimal contract. 
 
JEL:  D86, D63, M52.   
 
 
 
                                                 
♦
 Corresponding Author. Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, Kolkata-700032, INDIA. Email:   
   swapnendu@hotmail.com 
♣
 Email: maidip@gmail.com  
2 
 
1. Introduction: 
Standard economic theory, from its very inception, assumes that all economic participants 
are self-interested. This standard assumption, although is meaningful in many 
circumstances might not be true always. People are not always motivated by self-gain 
maximization; instead we often do care about others and react in fair, altruistic ways. Unfair 
distributions of wealth or consumption, relatively unequal payment structures do make us 
worried. From Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze (1982) and their famous experiment on 
‘ultimatum game’ to recent social experiments by Camerer (2003), various experimental 
evidences have proved the existence of other-regarding preferences in behavioural decision 
making1. In fact relaxing the self-regarding hypothesis is crucial for contract theory since 
the aim is to design appropriate incentives, and therefore people’s attitude towards other’s 
wellbeing as well as his own wellbeing is crucial for incentive design. However, so far not 
much work has been done to see how classical contract-theoretic predictions change in the 
presence of other-regarding preferences. We in this paper try to analyze how participants 
interact in presence of interdependent (other-regarding) preferences and how the 
conclusions obtained deviate from the standard case of self-interested participants. 
Specifically we focus on the case where there is hidden action and an other-regarding 
principal interacts with first a self regarding agent and then an other-regarding agent. The 
agent is income constrained implying that a limited liability constraint operates. We 
characterize the optimal contracts under various parametric cases and compare it with the 
standard self-regarding scenario. We see, first in the case of self-regarding agent, that the 
optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is inequity averse. Also the agent is 
                                                 
1
 For a comprehensive survey of these experimental studies see Fehr and Schmidt (2003). 
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generally (weakly) better-off under an ‘inequity averse’ principal compared to a ‘status 
seeking’ principal. Then we consider the case where an other-regarding principal interacts 
with an other-regarding agent. We characterize the optimal contracts and compare our 
results with Itoh (2004). In Itoh (2004) the principal was self regarding and there existed a 
unique optimal contract. Whereas, in our paper the principal is other regarding and we show 
that the same unique optimal contract exists for a ‘status seeking’ principal and this doesn’t 
necessarily hold for an inequity-averse principal. We also show that a status seeking 
principal is worse-off the more other regarding the agent is. An inequity-averse principal is 
also worse-off given that an additional condition holds. When the principal is behind and 
therefore always inequity-averse, she would always prefer a status seeking agent. This 
entire analysis is carried out in a single principal-agent framework; multiple agent case is 
kept for future research. 
             Examples of other-regarding principal can be an employer who is benevolent and 
cares about the welfare and income distribution of the employee vis-a-vis his own. Other 
examples can be the concept of ‘welfare capitalism’ where in some capitalist economies 
(mainly in Europe) there was (and still is) a practice of businesses providing welfare 
services to their employees. There are also examples of employee’s welfare cooperatives in 
Europe that took care of employee welfare in different dimensions2.  
                                                 
2
 Recent examples of companies that have practiced welfare capitalism include Kodak, Sears, and IBM which 
provides retirement benefits, health care, and employee profit-sharing, permanent employment, extensive 
security and fringe benefits among others (See Gordon (1994) for more). One interesting example from 
history can be Robert Owen, a utopian socialist of the early 19th century, who introduced one of the first 
private systems of philanthropic welfare for his workers at the cotton mills of New Lanark. He embarked on a 
scheme in New Harmony, Indiana to create a model cooperative, called the New Moral World. 
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         Quite a few recent papers have dealt with the matter of incorporating other regarding 
(or social) preferences into contract theory3. One of the earlier papers that talked about other 
regarding preferences and moral hazard is the paper by Itoh (2004). The paper focused 
mainly on the interaction between a self-regarding principal and an other-regarding agent 
and showed that the principal is in general worse-off the more other-regarding the agent is. 
Although Itoh (2004) briefly mention other-regarding principal, he doesn’t analyze the 
other-regarding principal self-interested agent case in detail, and this paper attempts to fill 
that gap and show that interesting non-trivial outcomes occur in such a structure. Englmaier 
and Wambach (2010)4 address optimal incentive contracts with inequity-averse agents and 
show that the optimal structure of the contracts does get altered. But they don’t focus on 
other-regarding principal. Dur and Glazer (2008) use a principal-agent model to study 
profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. They show that envy 
tightens the worker's participation constraint and calls for higher pay and/or a softer effort 
requirement. This paper is also an example where the agent is other-regarding whereas the 
principal is self-regarding whereas we focus exclusively on the case where the principal is 
other regarding5.  
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we examine the benchmark 
self-interested principal-agent case. In section 3 we analyze the interaction between other-
regarding principal and self-regarding agent. In section 4 we analyze the case where both 
                                                 
3
 For a survey on this topic see Englmaier (2005).  
4
 They focus on continuum of outcomes whereas we focus on discrete outcomes. 
5
 Other papers like Englmaier and Leider (2008) incorporate reciprocal preferences into a moral hazard 
framework and derive properties of the optimal contract and implications for organizational structure. Also 
Hart and Moore (1998) incorporate social preferences into a contracting problem but that was done in an 
incomplete contracting framework.  
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the principal and the agent are other-regarding. Section 5 provides concluding remarks and 
throws some light on future works. 
 
2. The self-interested benchmark: 
We briefly analyze how players react in a standard principal-agent framework where both 
parties are assumed to be self-interested in nature. We assume both the principal and agent 
to be risk-neutral. The principal hires an agent for engaging in a project, where the agent 
can choose either high or low effort denoted by 1e  and 0e  respectively where 01 ee >
6
. 
Effort is unobservable and hence non-verifiable. Cost to the agent for implementing effort 
1e  is d  and 0 for 0e . The project can either succeed or fail. The project returns b  in case of 
success and 0 in case of failure which are verifiable7. In case the agent puts ie  the project 
succeeds with probability 1,0  , =ipi  and it is assumed that 01 01 >>> pp . Denote 
01 ppp −=∆ . We assume that the value of b  is sufficiently high such that the principal 
optimally implements high effort over low effort. We maintain this assumption throughout 
the paper. 
Assumption 1: b  is sufficiently high such that it is optimal for the principal to elicit high 
effort from the agent i.e. pdppb ∆>∆ /1 holds.  
            The timing of the game is as follows: the principal offers a wage contract { }01 , ww  
where the agent is paid 1w  in case of success and 0w  if the project fails given 0≥jw , 
1,0=j , which implies that a limited liability (LL) constraint operates and therefore the 
                                                 
6
 Our intuition goes through even with continuum of effort choices.  
7
 Without loss of generality we focus on a 0-1 outcome.  
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agent cannot be paid a negative amount8. The agent then can either accept or reject the 
contract. If rejected, the game ends and the agent receives his outside option u  which is 
assumed to be 09. The project outcome is then realized and wages are paid accordingly. The 
payoff functions of the self-interested principal and the agent are jjP wbU −=  and 
jjA dwU −=  respectively where jb  and jd  are the project returns and effort costs in the jth 
state respectively, j = success, failure.  Similar to Itoh (2004) we assume that the principal 
wants to implement 1e  over 0e . Therefore the principal will maximize 
])1([ 01111 wpwpbp −+−  subject to the participation constraint                              
dwwp ≥+∆ 01 , the incentive compatibility constraint dpw ≥∆∆  and the limited liability 
constraints 0≥jw ; 1,0=j , where 01 www −=∆ . One optimal first-best contract when effort 
is observable is )0 ,/( 1pd 10. One can easily check that this first best doesn’t satisfy the 
incentive compatibility constraint and therefore no first best is implementable when effort is 
non-verifiable. The optimum wage contract, under non-verifiability, is stated below:  
Claim1: The optimal unique wage contract is given by )0* ,/*( 01 =∆= wpdw . No ‘first-
best’ wage contract can be implemented.  
The participation constraint will not bind at the optimum and the agent gets a rent equal 
to pdp ∆/0 . With this preamble we go over to our analysis of other-regarding principal and 
self regarding agent. 
 
                                                 
8
 This implies that the set of feasible contracts are given by ( ) ( ){ } LL satisfies ,, 0101 wwwwC = . 
9
 The implication is that at the optimum the participation constraint will not bind. One can extend the analysis 
to 0>u  without changing the qualitative aspect of the paper much. 
10
 In fact there is a continuum of first best contracts. 
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 3. Other regarding principal and self regarding agent: 
From various experimental evidences, starting from the ultimatum game, it has been shown 
that the principal is not always motivated by self-interest (see Forsythe et al., 1994). The 
principal might act other-regarding either because she is fair-minded, or she anticipates that 
otherwise, the unequal distribution of payoff might hurt the agent and thus he might 
retaliate and hurt the principal. Or, put simply, a principal can be benevolent and therefore 
might care about the wellbeing of the agent vis-à-vis his own payoff. As already mentioned 
in the introduction, the concepts of ‘welfare capitalism’ and the ‘employee’s welfare 
cooperatives’ in Europe stand testimony to the existence of other-regardingness in 
employer’s preferences. In this section, we will focus on the problem of a single other-
regarding principal interacting with a self-interested agent. We will try and characterize the 
optimal contracts in this framework. The major departure of this model from the benchmark 
one is that the utility function of the principal is not only a function of her own material 
payoff but also of the agent’s material payoff11. We work with a modified version of a 
piecewise linear utility function due to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Neilson and Stowe 
(2003). The function captures a broader class of other-regarding preferences viz. ‘inequity-
aversion’ and ‘status-seeking’ as will be explained shortly. All the other basic assumptions 
are kept same as the benchmark case. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Neilson and 
Stowe (2003) we can write the utility function of the principal as 
                                                 
11
 For more on other regarding preferences and different approaches see Itoh (2004). 
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                (1) 
The first part of the principal’s utility function corresponds to the case where principal’s net 
payoff (when the project succeeds) exceeds that of the agent’s i.e. 11 wwb >−  which 
implies 2/1 bw < . The second part corresponds to the case where principal is behind i.e. 
11 wwb <−  implying 2/1 bw > .  In case of failure, since 0=b  and 00 =w (limited liability 
binds as we will see), the question of principal or agent being ahead doesn’t arise. The 
parameter 0>pi , a constant, captures the extent to which the principal cares about the 
agent’s material payoff. If 0=pi  we get back the standard self-regarding case. ρ , another 
constant, captures situations where the principal is either ‘inequity averse’ or ‘status 
seeking’. If 0<ρ , the principal prefers to increase the difference in payoffs when he is 
ahead, i.e. the principal is ‘status seeking’13. If 0>ρ , the principal’s utility is decreasing in 
the difference in payoffs between the principal and the agent and therefore the principal is 
said to be ‘inequity averse’, even if he is ahead. When the principal is behind then he is 
always ‘inequity averse’. Along with this we make the standard assumptions that 0)0( =f  
and 0)( >′ zf  for 0>z . The objective of the principal is to maximize her own expected 
utility, subject to the agent participating in the project and putting in high effort. Now, as 
before, even here the implicit assumption we make is that the principal wants to implement 
high effort over low14.  
                                                 
12
 Itoh (2004) also works with the same function. Here we take the agents payoff to be his wage. One can 
alternatively specify agent’s payoff net of his effort cost, i.e. dw −  and it is straightforward to extend our 
analysis in this direction.  
13
 This terminology is due to Neilson and Stowe (2003). 
14
 Which implies  that the following condition holds: )()2( 0011111 bfpbpwbfpwpbp piρpiρ −≥−−− , i.e. the 
principal’s payoff from  implementing high effort exceeds that from implementing low effort.  
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Since the agent is self-interested the principal needs to satisfy the standard incentive 
compatibility constraint dpw ≥∆ 1  and the participation constraint dwp ≥11 of the agent in 
order to make the agent put in high effort and also accept the contract. Therefore at the 
optimum the principal has to offer pdw ∆≥ /1  in case of success. It is easy to check that the 
participation constraint will be satisfied and not bind15. Now given this, two possible cases 
might arise and are described below:  
(i) Case 1: pdb ∆> /2/  
Straightforward observation suggests that the principal will not offer 2/1 bw >′′  as it would 
mean that the principal will be behind the agent and thus the inequity-averse nature of the 
principal would lower her benefit further down. Hence, it is not optimal to have 2/1 bw >′′ . 
Therefore, this is the case where 1w  will optimally lie somewhere between pd ∆/  and 2/b  
and the principal will always be ahead at the optimum. Therefore, given binding limited 
liability implying 00 =′′w , the problem of the principal in this case can be formulated as: 
Maximize )]2([ 111 wbfwbpU P −−−= piρ  
                                  Subject to  
                                          (a) dwp ≥11   (Participation constraint) 
                                          (b) dpw ≥∆ 1  (Incentive compatibility constraint) 
 
We now state our first proposition: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
15
 This is a consequence of the assumption that the outside option of agent is 0. 
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Proposition 1:  
(a). )0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw is the unique optimal contract if the principal is status-seeking in 
nature )0( <ρ . 
(b). )0,2/( 01 =′′=′′ wbw will be the unique optimal contract if the principal is inequity-averse 
( 0>ρ ) and if 1)2('2 1 >− wbfpiρ  holds. 
(c). If 0>ρ  & 1)2('2 1 =′′− wbfpiρ  for some ]2/,/[1 bpdw ∆∈′′   then )0 ,( 1w ′′   is an optimal 
contract. However if (.)f  is linear and 1)2('2 1 =− wbfpiρ ∀ ]2/,/[1 bpdw ∆∈  then any 
contract { }0 ],2/,/[ 01 =′′∆∈′′ wbpdw   will be optimal. 
Proof:  
(a). The expected benefit to the principal when high effort is implemented is 
)]2([ 111 wbfwbpU P −−−= piρ  
Hence, 0]1)2('2[)2('2/ 111111 <−−=−+−=∂∂ wbfpwbfppwU P piρpiρ  if 0<ρ . Thus, 
pdw ∆=′′ /1  and it is unique. Therefore )0  ,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw  is the unique optimal contract 
if the principal is status-seeking. The agent gets a positive net expected payoff equal to 
pdp ∆/0  and the principal gets )]/2(/[1 pdbfpdbp ∆−−∆− piρ  which is certainly 
positive for 0<ρ . 
(b). Since ]1)2('2[/ 111 −−=∂∂ wbfpwU P piρ , if 1)2('2 1 >− wbfpiρ  then 0/ 1 >∂∂ wU P  
for 0>ρ . Therefore 2/*1 bw =  and it is unique implying that )0 ,2/( 01 =′′=′′ wbw would be 
the optimal contract iff 1)2('2 1 >− wbfpiρ . Note that in this case the loss from inequality 
is zero and the principal’s payoff is 2/1bp  whereas the agent gets 02/1 >− dbp , since 
pdb ∆> /2/  .  
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(c). For 0>ρ , 0/ 1 =∂∂ wBP  if 1)2('2 1 =− wbfpiρ . If (.)f  is linear and 
1)2('2 1 =− wbfpiρ holds for all 1w  then any ]2/  ,/[1 bpdw ∆∈′′  will be optimal. But if 
(.)f  is non-linear then 1)2('2 1 =− wbfpiρ  holds for any specific value of 1w  and that 
]2/  ,/[1 bpdw ∆∈  will be optimal.  QED 
The intuition of the first part is simple. Since the principal is status seeking, he enjoys being 
ahead and therefore he will optimally offer a wage (in case of success) that is as low as 
possible and just satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore the principal will 
optimally offer pdw ∆=′′ /1  and also gets the agent to put in high effort and accept the 
contract. The agent gets a positive net expected payoff equal to pdp ∆/0  since the 
participation constraint doesn’t bind at the optimum. In the second case two opposite effects 
are at play. First the direct effect of paying more to the agent reduces the utility of the 
principal. But the principal also suffers a utility loss from inequity. Therefore increasing 1w  
towards 2/b  reduces inequity and therefore leads to an increase in the principal’s utility. If 
the marginal utility gain due to reduced inequity is sufficiently high i.e. 1)2('2 1 >− wbfpiρ  
then second effect will dominate and therefore the principal will optimally offer 2/1 bw =′′  
if the project succeeds. But if the first effect dominates then it is optimal for the principal to 
offer a low enough wage to minimize the loss due to increased wage payment and therefore, 
pdw ∆=′′ /1  will be optimal. Finally, if the first effect is exactly outweighed by the second 
effect then the principal’s expected utility remains unchanged with respect to changes in 1w  
and any ]2/,/[1 bpdw ∆∈′′  will be optimal if (.)f  is linear. However if (.)f  is non-linear 
then 1)2('2 1 =′′− wbfpiρ  can hold only for a specific value of  1w  and therefore that 1w  will 
be the optimal wage in case of success. Therefore it is evident that the optimal contract is 
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sensitive to whether the principal is inequity-averse or status-seeking. Except for the 
situation where 1)2('2 1 =− wbfpiρ , the optimal contracts are ‘bang-bang’ in nature and are 
unique. But amidst all these, what happens to the agent’s payoff? The next proposition 
states the result: 
Proposition 2:  
The agent is (weakly) better-off under an inequity-averse principal than a status seeking 
principal.  
Proof:  
0// 0111 >∆=−∆>−′′ pdpdpdpdwp  ]2/  ,/(1 bpdw ∆∈′′∀  since pdb ∆> /2/ . Equality 
holds for pdw ∆=′′ /1 . Therefore, the result. QED 
 
Case 2: pdb ∆< /2/  
This is the case where the principal is certainly behind the agent when the project succeeds. 
Again, for the tractability of solution, we assume that b is sufficiently high such that it is 
optimal for the principal to offer a contract and elicit high effort from the agent. The 
principal is always inequity-averse when he is behind. Similar to the previous case, at the 
optimum, the limited liability will bind and therefore given that the principal wants to elicit 
high effort the principal’s problem becomes 
)]2([ 111 bwfwbpUMaximize P −−−= pi  
                    Subject to         (a) dwp ≥11                 Participation constraint 
                                           (b)  dpw ≥∆ 1              Incentive compatibility constraint 
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Since the principal wants to elicit high effort from the agent he cannot offer a success wage 
which is less than Pd ∆/  and since he is inequity averse it is optimum for the principal to 
offer just Pdw ∆=′′ /1  and ensure that the agent accepts the contract16. Therefore, 
)0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wPdw  will be the unique optimal contract. One final case we consider is 
when Pdb ∆= /2/ . It seems obvious that the optimal wage offer then would 
be )0,/2/( 01 =′′∆==′′ wPdbw . 
3.1. Alternative Specification: 
We have so far assumed that the principal compares his income jj wb −  to the 
agent’s jw . But since the principal knows that the agent incurs a private cost of 
implementing high effort, he might compare his net payoff jj wb −  to the ‘net’ earning 
dw j −  of the agent in case of high effort. In case of low effort the agent doesn’t incur any 
cost of effort. Thus under this alternate specification the new “other-regarding” utility 
function of the principal can be written as: 








−≤−−−−−
−≥−+−−−
= )()2(
)()2(
behindprincipaldwwbwhendbwfwb
aheadprincipaldwwbwhendwbfwb
U
ijjjijjjj
ijjjijjjj
P pi
piρ
  
where dd i =  for 1ee =  and 0=id  for 0ee = . Similar to the earlier case the principal is 
ahead (when the project succeeds) if dwwb −>− 11  holds implying 2/)(1 dbw +< . The 
second part corresponds to the case where principal is behind i.e. dwwb −<− 11  implying 
2/)(1 dbw +> .  We re-emphasize our assumption that the value of b  is such that at the 
optimum the agent only elicits high effort, therefore we need not worry about the situation 
                                                 
16
 This can also be seen from the fact that 2/ 0)]2('2[/ 11111 bwwhenbwfPpwBP ≥<−−−=∂∂ pi and 
therefore optimal success wage will be Pdw ∆=′′ /1 .  
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where the agent might put in low effort. All other assumptions of the previous section are 
kept intact.  
    Is it still optimum for the principal to offer zero wage in case of failure? To understand 
that note the subtle difference of this case with the earlier one. If the principal offers zero 
wage in case of failure the agent’s net payoff now is   d−  whereas the principal’s payoff is 
zero. Therefore the principal is always ahead when the project fails assuming that he pays 
zero in case of failure. Now a status seeking principal will enjoy this inequity and therefore 
he will optimally pay 00 =w . But a sufficiently inequity averse principal might not like this 
and therefore might optimally offer a positive wage in case of failure to minimize inequity 
and consequently offer a even higher 1w  so that the incentive compatibility is satisfied. 
Therefore whether or not limited liability binds will be conditional and the following lemma 
states a sufficient condition for limited liability to bind at the optimum: 
Lemma 1: The principal will optimally offer 00 =′′w  if 1)2('2 0 <− wdfpiρ  00 >∀w  
Proof: To fix ideas suppose the principal is ahead if the project succeeds. Now, given 1w  
the principal will choose that 0w  that will maximize his expected 
payoff ( )001111 2()1()]2([ wdfwpdwbfwbpU P −−−−++−−−= piρpiρ . Put differently 
if ( ) 0]1)2('2[1/ 010 <−−−=∂∂ wdfpwU P piρ  00 >∀w  then 00 =′′w .The principal can 
therefore optimally reduce 1w  such that the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. 
Again if the principal is behind if the project succeeds then the principal is inequity averse 
in case of success. Therefore the expected payoff function of the principal will be 
( )001111 2()1()]2([ wdfwpdbwfwbpU P −−−−+−−−−= piρpi . It is always the case 
that 0]1)2('21[/ 111 <−−−−−=∂∂ dbwfpwU P pi . Therefore reducing 1w  always benefits 
15 
 
the principal and therefore if 1)2('2 0 <− wdfpiρ  00 >∀w  holds then it is again optimum for 
the principal to set 00 =′′w  and reduce 1w  such that the incentive compatibility binds. QED 
Note that the above condition is automatically satisfied if the principal is status seeking, i.e. 
if 0<ρ . For the tractability of solutions, for the time being we will assume that the above 
condition holds and therefore at the optimum limited liability binds. 
Assumption 2: 1)2('2 0 <− wdfpiρ , 00 >∀w holds.  
Given assumption 2 we have 00 =′′w . Now we characterize the optimal contracts given that 
assumption 2 holds. Internalizing this the objective of the principal is to maximize her 
expected utility subject to the participation constraint dwp ≥11  and the incentive 
compatibility constraint dpw ≥∆ 1 . Similar to the previous situation we will consider the 
following two situations: if ( ) pddb ∆>+ /2/  then similar to the previous case the 
principal will not offer 2/)(1 dbw +>′′  as it would mean that the principal will be behind 
the agent and thus the inequity-averse nature of the principal would lower her benefit 
further down. Hence, it is not optimal to have 2/)(1 dbw +>′′ . Therefore, this is the case 
where 1w  will optimally lie somewhere between pd ∆/  and 2/)( db +  and the principal 
will always be ahead at the optimum. Therefore, given assumption 2 implying 00 =′′w , the 
problem for the principal is to maximize 
( ))()1()]2([ 1111 dfpdwbfwbpU P piρpiρ −−++−−−= subject to the participation 
constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. Since by assumption 2 we know that 
1(.)'2 <fpiρ  holds then the unique optimal solution will be )0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw . On the 
other hand if ( ) pddb ∆<+ /2/ , the wage offer 1w ′′  can’t be anything less than pd ∆/ to 
16 
 
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. Since, principal is always behind in this case, 
again the unique optimal wage offer will be )0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw . Therefore we get 
Proposition 3:   
If the effort cost is considered, given assumption 2, )0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw is the unique 
optimal contract irrespective of whether the principal is status-seeking or inequity averse.  
 
But if assumption 2 doesn’t hold the principal will optimally offer a positive 0w  such that 
the inequity from being ahead is minimized. Therefore if the optimal failure wage is set at 
2/0 dw =′′  then the resultant utility loss from inequity when the project fails goes to zero. 
Again we can consider the two previous sub-cases. If ( ) pddb ∆>+ /2/ , given 2/0 dw =′′  
and given that 1(.)'2 >fpiρ  holds the optimal success wage is set at ( ) 2/1 dbw +=′′  and one 
can check that the incentive compatibility is satisfied if pdb ∆> /2/ . Again if 
( ) pddb ∆<+ /2/  then the only contract that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint 
is )0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw . Therefore 
Claim 2:  
If 1(.)'2 >fpiρ  and ( ) pddb ∆>+ /2/  holds, then ( ) )2/,2/( 01 dwdbw =′′+=′′  will be the 
unique optimal contract. The limited liability will not bind in this case. Otherwise 
)0,/( 01 =′′∆=′′ wpdw  is optimal and the limited liability will bind at the optimum. 
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4. Both Other Regarding Principal and Agent: 
We now examine the situation where both the principal and the agent are other regarding 
and both the principal and the agent cares about each other’s material payoffs. The 
principal’s other regarding utility function is given by (1) as in section 3. The primitives of 
the agent’s possible effort choices and the associated costs and other assumptions remain 
the same as in the benchmark model (i.e. section 2). In addition to this, following Itoh 
(2004), we assume that the agent also has the following utility structure: 
           AU = 



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              (2) 
where 0>α  captures the extent to which the agent cares about the principal’s material 
payoff. When 0=α , we get back the standard self-regarding case. The constant γ captures 
situations where the agent is ‘inequity averse’ or ‘status seeking’. If 0<γ , the agent is 
‘status seeking’17 whereas when 0>γ  the agent is ‘inequity averse’. Also when the agent is 
behind then he is always ‘inequity averse’. We retain the standard assumptions that 
0)0( =v  and 0)( >′ zv  for 0>z . Therefore in essence the modeling of other-regardingness 
of the agent is similar to that of the principal (following Nelson and Stowe (2003)). 
    Once again to simplify our analysis we start with the assumption that 00 =′′w . Later we 
will show that at the optimum the limited liability will indeed bind. Now given the current 
specification the agent doesn’t suffer from inequity when the project fails, following Itoh 
(2004), the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent can be written as follows: 
                      pdbwvw ∆≥−− /)2( 11 αγ     if 2/1 bw >                                                 (ICa) 
                                                 
17
 This terminology is due to Neilson and Stowe (2003). 
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                             pdwbvw ∆≥−− /)2( 11 α         if 2/1 bw ≤                                         (ICb) 
where (ICa) and (ICb) are the incentive compatibility of the agent when he is ahead and 
behind respectively. 
Lemma 2 (Itoh (2004)):  A necessary condition for a contract to satisfy (ICb) is                                              
pdb ∆≥ /2/ . 
The proof of the above lemma is given in Itoh (2004).  The logic is simple, the left hand 
side of (ICb) is increasing in 1w . Therefore at least one contract satisfying (ICb) will exist if 
the (ICb) is satisfied at 2/1 bw = . Putting 2/1 bw =  in (ICb) we get the required condition. 
Now, one can define 1~w  such that  
                                pdwbvw ∆=−− /)2(~ 11 α                                                                     (3) 
It is straightforward to show that 2/~1 bw ≤  if pdb ∆≥ /2/  holds. We focus on the 
following two sub-cases. 
Case 1: pdb ∆≥ /2/  
This is the case where the principal is (weakly) ahead of the agent since 2/1 bw ≤ . We can 
therefore state the next result which is in essence similar to what has been stated in Itoh 
(2004) and this holds when the principal is status seeking i.e. 0<ρ .  
Proposition 4:  If pdb ∆≥ /2/  holds then ( )0 ,~1w  in the unique optimal contract for a 
status seeking principal if both )('21 zfpiρ>  and )('21 zvαγ>  holds 0 >∀ z . 
Proof: We complete the proof in several steps. 
Step 1: First we will show that ( )0 ,~1w  is a candidate optimal contract. Since  ( )0 ,~1w  is 
found by satisfying (ICb) with equality it will suffice to show that ( )0 ,~1w  satisfies the 
participation constraint. Since by definition 111 //)~2(~ pdpdwbvw ≥∆=−− α  it is proved 
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that ( )0 ,~1w  satisfies the participation constraint. Therefore ( )0 ,~1w  is a candidate optimal 
contract. 
Step 2: Now to show the uniqueness of  ( )0 ,~1w  we go by the method of contradiction. 
Suppose ( )0 ,~1w  is not the optimal contract and there exists another optimal contract 
( )01  , ww  such that 00 >w . We will show that if )('21 zfpiρ>  0 >∀ z , it must be that 
2/1 bw <  since 00 >w . To do that first we show that if the principal is status seeking then 
an optimal contract ( )01  , ww  with 2/1 bw >  and  00 >w  is not a possibility. But if a 
contract like that existed then the principal would have been behind under both success and 
failure states under ( )01 , ww  and therefore the following must hold: 
[ ] ( )[ ] [ ])~2(~)2(1)2( 111001111 wbfwbpwfwpbwfwbp −−−>−−−+−−− piρpipi  
⇒ [ ] ( )[ ] 0)2(1)2()~2(~ 00111111 >+−>−−−+− wfwpbwfwbfwwp pipipiρ  since 00 >w  
which in turn implies that )~2()2(~ 1111 wbfbwfww −−−>− piρpi . It is obvious that 
0)~2()2( 11 >−−− wbfbwf piρpi  for 0<ρ  and therefore 0~ 11 >− ww . Since 2/~1 bw < , 
2/1 bw >  is never a possibility. So a contract ( )01 , ww  such that 2/1 bw >  and 00 >w  is 
ruled out18.  
     The other possibility is a contract ( )01 , ww  such that 2/1 bw ≤  and 00 >w . We will 
show that it must be the case that 11~ ww > . Now given 2/1 bw ≤ , the principal is (weakly) 
ahead when the project succeeds and behind when the project fails and therefore the 
principal’s expected payoff under ( )01 , ww  is given as 
                                                 
18
 Also note that if 11~ ww >  then both )2( 1 bw −  and )~2( 1wb −  can’t be positive and since the function )(zf  
is defined for 0>z the analysis becomes mathematically inconsistent.   
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[ ] ( )[ ])2(1)2( 001111 wfwpwbfwbp pipiρ −−−+−−− . Again by assumption ( )01 , ww  is 
optimal and this implies that the following holds:   
  [ ] ( )[ ] [ ])~2(~)2(1)2( 111001111 wbfwbpwfwpwbfwbp −−−>−−−+−−− piρpipiρ  
which in turn implies that 
  [ ] ( )[ ] 0)2(1)2()~2(~ 00111111 >+−>−−−+− wfwpwbfwbfwwp pipiρpiρ  since 00 >w . 
Now for [ ] 0)2()~2(~ 11111 >−−−+− wbfwbfwwp piρpiρ  to hold we need 
[ ] [ ])2()~2(~ 1111 wbfwwbfw −+>−+ piρpiρ  to hold. Put differently if [ ])2( 11 wbfw −+piρ  is 
an increasing function of 1w  i.e. if  (.)'21 fpiρ>  holds then certainly the previous inequality 
holds which implies that 11~ ww >  and therefore 2/1 bw <  holds. So if another optimal 
contract ( )01  , ww  such that 00 >w exists then it must be that 11 ~ww < . Note that the 
condition )('21 zfpiρ>  is always true for a status seeking principal. The final step shows 
that if )('21 zvαγ>  then no contract ( )01  , ww  such that 00 >w  can be optimal.  
Step 3: Now, given 2/1 bw <  and we will follow Itoh (2004) to complete the proof. 
Since ( )01 , ww  satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint we get 
                              pdwvwbvw ∆≥+−−∆ /)2()2( 01 αγα                                                   (4) 
Combining (4) and (3) we get 
)~2()2(/)~2()2(~)2( 11101110 wbvwbvpwwbvwbvwwv ww −−−++∆≥−−−+≥+∆ αααααγ
                                                                                                                                               (5) 
Similar to Itoh (2004), after re-arranging terms we get 
                 )~2()2()2(/ 11010 wbvwbvwvpw −−−≥+− αααγ                                             (6) 
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Since 11~ ww > , the right hand side of (6) is positive. Thus, if the left hand side is non-
positive, ( )01 , ww  does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint, which is a 
contradiction. )('21 zvαγ>  ensures that the left hand side is non-positive and therefore 
( )01 , ww  such that 00 >w cannot be an optimal contract. Therefore ( )0 ,~1w  is the unique 
optimal contract. QED 
A pathological case arises when the principal is in-equity averse, (that is 0>ρ ) and it is 
not certain that 0)~2()2( 11 >−−− wbfbwf piρpi . But if the principal is moderately in-equity 
averse in the sense that ρ  is not very high such that 0)~2()2( 11 >−−− wbfbwf piρpi  holds 
then our previous result will follow19.   
For the rest of our analysis we assume that both )('21 zfpiρ>  and )('21 zvαγ>  holds 0 >∀ z  
and we maintain this as an assumption.  
Assumption 3: Both )('21 zfpiρ>  and )('21 zvαγ>  holds 0 >∀ z .  
What happens to the principal’s expected utility when the agent becomes more other-
regarding? The next result sheds some light on this: 
Proposition 5: A status seeking principal is worse-off the more other regarding the agent 
is. An inequity averse principal is also worse-off if 1)(2 <′ zfpiρ  holds.  
Proof: Note that the principal’s optimal expected utility in this case will be 
)]~2(~[ 111* wbfwbpU P −−−= piρ . Therefore αpiραα ∂
∂
−
′+
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂ 1
1
1
1
* ~
)~2(2
~ w
wbfwpU P   
                                                 
19
 But if 0)~2()2( 11 <−−− wbfbwf piρpi  then there might be a case where there might exist a contract 
( )01 , ww  such that 11~ ww <  with 2/1 bw >  and 00 >w holds. This arises due to the fact that if the principal is 
strongly in-equity averse then the loss from inequity is more under ( )0 ,~1w . Therefore it is technically possible 
for another contract ( )01 , ww  such that 2/1 bw >  and 00 >w  to make the principal relatively better-off vis-à-
vis ( )0 ,~1w  . But if the principal is not sufficiently inequity averse when ahead then this pathological case can 
be ruled out. 
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= [ ]1)~2(2~ 11 −−′∂
∂
wbfw piρ
α
. Now from (3) 1~w  is defined such that 
pdwbvw ∆=−− /)2(~ 11 α . Let ( ) )2(~ 11 wbvwf −−= αα  and therefore 
( ) ( ) 0~2 1 <−−=∂
∂
wbvf
α
α
 for 2/~1 bw < . To maintain equality (3) 1~w  has to increase and 
therefore 0
~
1 >
∂
∂
α
w
. Now if 0<ρ , then 0
*
<
∂
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α
PU
 unambiguously. Again if 0>ρ  then 
0
*
<
∂
∂
α
PU
 iff 1)(2 <′ zfpiρ  holds. QED 
To explain the above proposition, note that the agent is always behind and therefore is 
inequity averse in this situation. So the greater the α , more wage will have to be paid to the 
agent to make up for the agent’s welfare loss due to inequity. Now a status seeking 
principal will hate this increased wage payment and therefore will be unambiguously 
worse-off the more other –regarding the agent. On the contrary a, inequity-averse principal 
might like this increased wage payment since this will lead to reduced inequity and if the 
positive in-equity effect dominates the negative wage effect then the inequity-averse 
principal will be better-off dealing with a more other-regarding agent. Put differently the 
inequity-averse principal will not prefer a more other fair-minded agent if the negative 
wage effect dominates the positive in-equity effect. The condition 1)(2 <′ zfpiρ  ensures 
that the negative wage effect dominates the positive in-equity effect.  
 
Case 2: pdb ∆< /2/  
We now briefly consider the case where pdb ∆< /2/  holds and therefore (ICb) cannot be 
satisfied and thus the principal has to choose a contract ( )0,1w  such that 2/1 bw >  to satisfy 
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(ICa). The principal is always behind in this situation and therefore inequity averse. The 
agent can be either inequity-averse or status seeking. To fix ideas define *1w  such that the 
following holds: 
                                    pdbwvw ∆=−− /)*2(* 11 γα                                                             (4) 
Define ( ) )*2(* 11 bwvwg −−= γαα  and we get ( ) ( )bwvg −−=∂
∂
*2 1γα
α
. Since for 
2/*1 bw >  if 0>γ  we get  
( ) ( ) 0*2 1 <−−=∂
∂ bwvg γ
α
α
 and therefore to maintain equality 
(4) *1w should increase given )('21 zvαγ>  (assumption3). Therefore we get 0
*1 >
∂
∂
α
w
. The 
principal’s expected utility is given by )]*2(*[ 111* bwfwbpU P −−−= pi  and it is 
immediate that the principal is worse off given an increase in *1w  since 
[ ] 0)*2(21
*
11
1
*
<−′−−=
∂
∂ bwfp
w
U P pi . Therefore if the agent is inequity averse then a more 
other-regarding agent makes the (inequity averse) principal worse-off. But if 0<γ  we get 
0*1 <
∂
∂
α
w
 and since 0
*1
*
<
∂
∂
w
U P
 which implies that a more status seeking agent makes the 
(inequity averse) principal better-off. We can state the above finding succinctly: 
Proposition 6: If pdb ∆< /2/  holds then the principal is inequity averse and would always 
prefer a status seeking agent. 
An inequity-averse principal will never benefit from a more inequity-averse (fair-minded) 
agent. This is due to the fact that the principal is already behind in this case and if the agent 
is inequity averse the agent hates being ahead. Therefore if the agent becomes more 
inequity-averse he has to be compensated more by an increased wage. This will hurt the 
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already behind inequity averse principal more. On the contrary the principal will benefit 
from a more status-seeking agent. Since in this case the principal is behind the agent and the 
agent being status seeking enjoys being ahead. Now if the agent becomes more status 
seeking the principal can optimally reduce his payment and still get to elicit high effort 
from the agent. Put differently now it is possible for the principal to implement high effort 
from the agent at a lower cost. This in turn makes the principal less-behind and therefore 
the inequity-averse principal will benefit from a more status seeking agent.  
5. Conclusion: 
This paper analyzes optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts separately 
with a self-regarding and other-regarding agent that hitherto has been left untouched in the 
literature. We showed that when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding 
agent the optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ 
compared to the self-regarding case. Put differently when the principal is status seeking we 
get back the self regarding result whereas when the principal is inequity averse the optimal 
success wage is considerably higher than the self regarding case. Then we considered the 
case of an other-regarding principal interacting with an other-regarding agent and we show 
that the a unique optimal contract similar to Itoh (2004) exists but if the principle is status 
seeking, otherwise not. We also show that a status seeking principal is worse-off the more 
other regarding the agent is. An inequity-averse principal can also worse-off under certain 
parametric configurations.  Finally when the principal is behind and therefore always 
inequity-averse, she would always prefer a status seeking agent. One limitation of our paper 
is that we in this paper consider a single principal agent interaction whereas one can 
conceive of a situation where an other-regarding principal is interacting with more than one 
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agents. Therefore a natural extension of this paper is to consider a multi-agent framework 
but one has to be careful while defining other-regardingness of the principal in the multi-
agent framework.  
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